Appeasement Agreement

Gepostet von am Apr 8, 2021 in Allgemein | Keine Kommentare

Six months later, in March 1939, German troops recaptured the rest of Czechoslovakia. Poland appeared to be the most likely victim of the Nazi aggression, and Chamberlain joined the Poles to defend them in Germany. Hitler did not believe that Britain would go to war with Poland after not doing so about Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, he sent his soldiers to Poland. On the same day, Britain declared war on Germany. In his post-war memories, Churchill, an opponent of appeasement, put Poland and Hungary in the same bag, which then annexed parts of Czechoslovakia with Poland and Hungary, with Germany being a „vulture on the carcass of Czechoslovakia“. [64] On 29 and 30 September 1938, an emergency meeting of the major European powers was held in Munich, without Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, allied with France and Czechoslovakia. An agreement was quickly reached on Hitler`s terms. It was signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. On the military front, the Sudetenland was of strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, as most of its border defences were there to protect themselves from a German attack. The agreement between the four powers was signed with low intensity in the context of an undeclared German-Czechoslovak war, which had begun on 17 September 1938. Meanwhile, after 23 September 1938, Poland transferred its military units to the common border with Czechoslovakia. [2] Czechoslovakia bowed to diplomatic pressure from France and Great Britain and decided on 30 September to cede Germany to Munich conditions.

Fearing a possible loss of Zaolzie to Germany, Poland issued an ultimatum to Zaolzie, with a majority of Polish ethnic groups, which Germany had accepted in advance and accepted Czechoslovakia on 1 October. [3] The view that Chamberlain had worked with Hitler to attack Russia continued, however, especially on the far left. [78] In 1999, Christopher Hitchens wrote that Chamberlain had made „a cold calculation that Hitler had to be armed again… partly to promote its „hard“ solution to the Bolshevik problem in the East. [36] Although the deliberate promotion of a war with Stalin is not universally accepted as the motive for the soothing Downing Street, there is a historical consensus that anticommunism was essential to the attraction of the appeased elite. [35] As Antony Beevor writes: „The policy of appeasement was not the invention of Neville Chamberlin. His roots were in fear of Bolshevism. The general strike of 1926 and the depression made the possibility of revolution a very real concern of conservative politicians.

As a result, they had mixed feelings towards the German and Italian regimes, which had crushed the communists and socialists in their own country. [79] The British public expected an imminent war, and Chamberlain`s „statesman`s gesture“ was initially applauded. He was greeted as a hero by the royal family and invited to the balcony of Buckingham Palace before submitting the agreement to the British Parliament. The general positive reaction quickly re-established despite the royal patronage. However, there was resistance from the beginning. Clement Attlee and labor rejected the deal in alliance with the two Conservative MPs Duff Cooper and Vyvyan Adams, who until then had been seen as a hard and reactionary element in the Conservative party. In his 1961 book The Origins of the Second World War, A.J.P. Taylor overthrew this vision of appeasement as an avoidable mistake and cowardice.